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Perceptual Content and Monadic Truth: On Cappelen and Hawthorne's *Relativism and Monadic Truth*

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In *Relativism and Monadic Truth* Herman Cappelen and John Hawthorne (C & H) set out to defend a monadic theory of truth which they say can be summarized by the following five theses:

> (T1)   There are propositions and they instantiate the fundamental monadic properties of truth simpliciter and falsity simpliciter.

> (T2)   The semantic values of declarative sentences relative to contexts of utterance are propositions.

> (T3)   Propositions are the objects of propositional attitudes, such as belief, hope, wish, doubt, etc.

> (T4)   Propositions are the objects of illocutionary acts; they are, e.g. what we assert and deny.

> (T5)   Propositions are the objects of agreement and disagreement.

They call T1-T5 the 'simple view' or 'Simplicity' for short (I will use 'Simplicity' and 'the monadic truth package' synonymously). C & H say that Simplicity is neutral on what exactly propositions are. They may be Russellian or of some different variety. This, however, does not seem quite right.   For example, it is not obvious that Simplicity and Fregeanism are compatible. The 1-intension of 'That instantiates a property that normally gives rise to red sensations in me' has a truth-value only relative to a centered world (or a triple of a world, an individual and a time) (Chalmers 2006b). So, Simplicity rules out a treatment of 1-intensions as propositions (and

hence also rules out a treatment of pairs of 1-intensions and 2-intensions as propositions). But I shall set aside this concern for now, though it will resurface in a different form below.

C & H's book is meant to offer a general argument against assessment-sensitive relativism (relativism proper) and special versions of relativism, including non-indexical contextualism and temporalism. Their last chapter illustrates how their view applies to predicates of personal taste (for a relativistic treatment of predicates of personal taste, see e.g. Lasersohn 2009). The core of their argument is that most of the evidence in favor of relativism can be handled by a version of flexible contextualism that takes the candidate expressions to be associated with a hidden variable that can take on values other than the speaker. For example, 'this chili is tasty' has the underlying form 'this chili is tasty to X', where the value of 'X' can be the speaker, the hearer or a third party. I will begin with a brief presentation of C & H's arguments against non-indexical contextualism, temporalism and relativism. I will then offer a general argument against the monadic truth package. Finally, I will offer arguments in favor of non-indexical contextualism and temporalism. A version of flexible contextualism with respect to color discourse has been defended by Jonathan Cohen in his latest book *The Red and the Real*. As my main arguments focus primarily on perceptual content and color discourse, they will thus apply also to Cohen's theory of colors.

1. C & H's Main arguments against Relativism

Non-Indexical Contextualism:

Non-indexical contextualism is the view that context-sensitive expressions have a content that remains stable across contexts of use but have extensions that vary with contexts of use (MacFarlane 2009). For example, if 'cold' is context-sensitive, then its semantic content *coldness* remains stable across contexts of use but its content *coldness* has an extension only relative to a speaker and a time. As a result, when Tim says 'the antechamber is cold', his utterance, i.e., the sentence relative to Tim's context of use, is true or false simpliciter but the proposition expressed by his utterance is true or false only relative to the speaker (here: Tim).

C & H's section on non-indexical contextualism is short: just under four pages. C & H say that they will not provide a detailed discussion of the position because they think the view does not occupy 'an interesting position in logical space' (p. 21). Setting aside issues of tense, the defender of monadic truth can adhere to the following principles:

P1: If S expresses the content P at context C, then S is true at C iff the content P is true

P2: An assertion/utterance with the content P is true iff the content P is true.

A non-indexical contextualist with respect to type-T content rejects that type-T content has a truth-value simpliciter; hence, she must reject P1 and P2. According to C & H, this has unwelcome consequences. They offer the following example: 'Crispin walks into the antechamber of the baths from the outside and declares "the antechamber is not cold". Tim walks in from the hot baths and declares "the antechamber is cold" ' (p. 18). According to C & H, the non-indexicalist recommends that Tim says to Crispin:

(A) Your utterance is true but the claim that you are making by your utterance is not true
(B) Your assertion is true but the proposition that are expressing by your assertion is not true.
(C) You know that your assertion is true and your know that your assertion is an assertion that it is not cold and that you are not half bad at deducing the obvious, but you are in no position to know that it is not cold.

C & H conclude on this ground that non-indexical contextualism is not an 'interesting position'. The most important lesson I have learned during my philosophical career is that on occasion we must bite a few intuition bullets if we want to have a taste of the true. Is this one of those occasions? Not according to C & H. C & H say that they 'find it hard to see any significant avenues opened up by non-indexical contextualism'. (p. 24).   Below I will argue that C & H haven't looked hard enough, as non-indexical contextualism offers the best overall account of color discourse and tensed discourse. Hence, we must bite a few bullets. It should be noted, though, that if more careful attention is paid to what is expressed by (A)-(C), the bullets become better-tasting and easier to swallow. Arguably, (A)-(C) leave a bad taste in your mouth only because they encourage the reader to equivocate on the term 'true'. Two different notions of truth are in play here. One is monadic utterance truth, the other relative propositional truth. A better-tasting and more easily digestible version of (A) would be: Your utterance, i.e. the sentence relative to your context of use, is true simpliciter but the proposition you are expressing by your utterance is not true relative to me as the speaker, though it is true relative to you as the speaker.

Temporalism:

Temporalism is a special version of non-indexical contextualism.   It holds that some propositions have different truth-values at different times.   Temporalism is closely related to

what C & H call 'temporality'. Temporality is the view that some propositions that are true simpliciter will be false or were false.   Temporality entails temporalism if eternalism is true, but not if presentism is true. According to presentism, only present things exist.   President Obama, iPhones and tigers exist; Bertrand Russell, Dinosaurs, and flying cars do not. As there is only one time (the present) if presentism is true, temporalism is false: It is not the case that propositions can have different truth-values at different times. So, the conjunction of temporality and presentism is compatible with Simplicity: Given the conjunction of temporality and presentism, 'Paul is dancing' expresses a temporally neutral proposition.   As there is only one time, this proposition has a truth-value simpliciter. Suppose it is true. It could nonetheless have been false (before Paul started dancing), and it could become false in the future (when Paul stops dancing).

While the conjunction of temporality and presentism is compatible with Simplicity, the conjunction of temporality and eternalism is incompatible with Simplicity. If eternalism is true, past and future times are real. So, temporality entails temporalism. But temporalism is in direct conflict with C & H's T1.

On a special version of eternalism, the domain of objects is constant at all times, but all concrete things are present, whereas past and future things are abstract. Call this view the 'passage view'.   The conjunction of the passage view and temporality is also incompatible with Simplicity. On the passage view, it is true that it was the case that (there is a time t which will never be present, and dinosaurs exist at t). Moreover, as the domain of objects is constant across times, the Barcan and converse Barcan formulas are true. Hence, 'it was the case that there is a time t which will never be present, and dinosaurs exist at t' entails 'there is an x such that it was the case that x is a time which will never be present and dinosaurs exist at x'.   So, there are two times: the present time and x (a past abstract time).   But given temporality, there are temporally neutral propositions (that are true/false but were false/true or will be false/true). But, as there are two times (the present time and x), these temporally neutral propositions are not true or false simplicter. Rather: They are true or false relative to the present time, and true or false relative to x. For example, if Paul is now dancing but was not dancing when there were dinosaurs, then 'Paul is dancing' is true relative to the present time but false relative to x.   So, the conjunction of temporality and the passage view is in conflict with Simplicity.

David Kaplan (1977/1989) famously defended temporalism.[1] One of Kaplan's main arguments for temporalism is the argument from intensional operators.   As Kaplan points out,

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[1] It is perhaps a bit unfair to say that Kaplan defended temporalism, as he was willing to say that temporally neutral contents are not propositions in the traditional sense. However, his view comes very close to temporalism, and is incompatible with Simplicity, as Kaplan allows his temporally neutral contents to be the objects of attitudes.

if the tenses are operators and 'they are not to be vacuous, [then they must] operate on contents which are neutral with respect to features of circumstance the operator is interested in' (p. 503). Tense operators are neutral with respect to time. Hence, tense operators must operate on temporally neutral contents.   For example, the past tense in 'John was a soldier in WW II' must operate on the temporally neutral content *John is a soldier in WW II*.[2]

One might wonder whether temporalism requires a treatment of the tenses as intentional operators. The answer to this question does not directly affect our assessment of Simplicity, as Simplicity is in direct conflict with temporalism.   But it nonetheless is of independent interest and hence worth quickly addressing. It may be thought temporalism is compatible with a quantifier treatment of the tenses. For example, it may be urged that 'John was a soldier' is to be interpreted as (A) '$\exists t[t < t_n$ & John is a soldier at $t]$', where t_n is an unbound variable. The latter, one could argue, is temporally neutral because it expresses a proposition that is true at $<w_1, t_1>$ (if John is a soldier at some time before t_1) but false at $<w_1, t_0>$ (if John is not a soldier at any time before t_0). However, (A) cannot be a proposition expressed by 'John was a soldier'. For (A) contains an unbound variable that needs completion by context, viz. 't_n' (it needs completion by context because it is unbound). Propositions (as standardly construed on a Kaplanian or Russellian account) cannot have unbound variables in them. Propositional structures with unbound variables are propositional functions, not propositions. So, for 'John was a soldier' to express a proposition the free variable in (A) would need to be completed by context. And once it is completed by context, the proposition expressed is: $\exists t[t < t^*$ & John is a soldier at $t]$, where t^* is the time of utterance. So, it is not an option for the temporalist to take 'John was a soldier' to express the propositional structure indicated in (A). So, temporalism seems to require a treatment of the tenses as operators.

Be that as it may. Temporalism is in direct conflict with the monadic truth package. So, C & H must reject Kaplan's argument as unsound.   Assuming that they don't want to accept presentism, one obvious way to refute the argument for them would be to maintain that the tenses are quantifiers and not operators (see King 2003), or alternatively: maintain that the tenses *are* operators but deny that the temporally neutral contents operated on are propositions and are the objects of propositional attitudes.

However, this is not C & H's strategy. Their strategy is to argue that the tenses are not intensional operators in English. 'Quickly' in 'Quickly, he left the building' is not an operator but an adverb modifying the verb 'left'.   The sentence containing the adverb provides an answer to the question 'how did he leave?'. Similarly, C & H argue, 'In Boston' in 'In Boston Paul is dancing' is not an intensional operator but is of a different syntactic category. For example,

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[2] Or alternatively: *John was a soldier*.

one might suggest that it provides an answer to the question 'where is Paul dancing?'. According to C & H, these considerations carry over to tense. 'Paul danced' is not to be parsed as 'It was the case that (Paul is dancing)'. Like adverbs the past tense is a modifier of sorts and does not enjoy sententiality. Below I will argue that there is good reason to think temporalism is true, and as temporalism requires a treatment of the tenses as intensional operators, there is good reason to think that the tenses enjoy sententiality.

Relativism Proper:

Relativism proper with respect to an expression type T is the view that expressions of type T have contents that remain stable across contexts of use and contexts of assessment but have extensions that vary with contexts of assessment. Accordingly, relativism treats not only propositional truth but also utterance truth as relative to contexts of assessment. For example, if 'tasty' is a truly relative expression, then John's utterance of 'this is tasty' may be true relative to John in the role of assessor but false relative to Mary in the role of assessor.

C & H's main argument against relativism proper is that the data typically used to motivate relativism can be accommodated equally well, or better, by a version of flexible (indexical) contextualism. For example, it is sometimes noted that if John says 'this chili is tasty', then Mary can use 'John said that this chili is tasty' to report what John said even if she doesn't like the chili. But she cannot do this if the content of her utterance expresses the proposition that John said that this chili is tasty to Mary. This suggests that speaker contextualism that takes content to vary with the speaker's standards cannot accommodate the data.

Another common diagnostic of whether an expression is context-sensitive or assessment-sensitive is to look at whether there can be meaningful disagreement among disputants with different standards. For example, we can imagine John and Mary get into an argument over whether a certain chili is tasty. Relativists sometimes take this to indicate that 'tasty' is assessment-sensitive, not context-sensitive. After all, if it had been context-sensitive in the standard way, then 'this chili is tasty' would, when uttered by John, express the proposition that this chili is tasty to John, and 'this chili is not tasty' would, when uttered by Mary, express the proposition that this chili is not tasty to Mary. But *this chili is tasty to John* and *this chili is not tasty to Mary* are not contradictory propositions. Hence, standard contextualists cannot accommodate disagreement data.

However, as C & H point out, diagnostics that focus on the verb construction 'say that' (and 'believe that') or rely on conversational disputes are unreliable as diagnostics of whether an expression is context-sensitive or assessment sensitive. First, mixed quotation is hard to

hear. When the sentence 'John said that 'this chili is tasty'' ' is read out loud, the quotation marks cannot be heard. Second, collective reports of the form 'A and B said that p' have true readings even when 'p' contains an obviously context-sensitive expression, as in 'A said that Angie is ready to take the exam, and B said that Angie is ready to leave. So, A and B both said that Angie is ready'. Third, flexible contextualism need not build the speaker into the proposition expressed by the relevant utterance but can by virtue of being flexible build in any other person, depending on what is presupposed in the conversational context.

According to C & H, a better diagnostic of whether an expression is context-sensitive rather than assessment-sensitive focuses on 'agree that' rather than 'say that' or disagreement data. Even if 'A believes p' and 'B believes p' are true reports, 'A and B agree that p' does not have a true reading when 'p' contains a context-sensitive expression, witness the oddity of 'A believes Angie is ready to take the exam, and B believes Angie is ready to leave. Hence, A and B both agree that Angie is ready'.

Flexible contextualism, as noted, takes the expressions that seem to vary with an assessor to be associated with a hidden variable which can take on values other than the speaker. Flexible contextualism is standardly accepted for expressions like 'local', 'left', and 'nearby'. For example, 'Mel went to a nearby beach' expresses a proposition of the form 'Mel went to a beach nearby to L' and the value of the location parameter is supplied by the conversational context. If the speaker and hearer are in NYC but it is presupposed by the speaker and hearer that Mel is visiting her grandmother in Florida, then 'Mel went to a nearby beach' may express the proposition that Mel went to a beach nearby to where her grandmother lives.

The flexible view can also accommodate collective reports. If A thinks Angie went to a beach nearby to A, and B thinks that Angie went to a beach nearby to B, then it is acceptable to say 'A and B believe that Angie went to a nearby beach'. This reading can be accommodated with lambda abstraction. 'A and B believe that Angie went to a nearby beach' has the underlying form 'A and B λ(x believes that Angie went to a beach nearby$_{(to\ x)}$'.   I think this is a nice move but it is not clear to me how it is supposed to generalize more widely. Consider 'A and B were both told by their mothers that Angie went to a nearby beach'. Suppose the two mothers and A and B are in four different locations, and suppose it is clear in the context that A was told that Angie went to a beach nearby to A's mother, and that B was told that Angie went to a beach nearby to B. Then it would seem that the only way to handle the case is to treat it as the conjunction 'A was told by her mother that Angie went to a beach nearby to L_1, and B was told by her mother that Angie went to a beach nearby to L_2'.

But that aside, it seems that flexible contextualism can handle expressions like 'nearby'. If A thinks Angie went to a beach nearby to A, and B thinks that Angie went to a beach nearby

to B, then it is unacceptable to say 'A and B agree that Angie went to a nearby beach'.   Flexible contextualism can explain why it is unacceptable. It is unacceptable because there is no one variable to assign to the variable associated with 'nearby', and lambda abstraction does not work with 'agree', as agreement requires a commonly agreed upon value assignment.

According to H & C, flexible contextualism extends to the sorts of expressions that have typically been treated as relativistic. They focus on predicates of personal taste, e.g. 'filling', 'fun', and 'tasty'. On their flexible semantics, 'that is filling' has the underlying form 'that is filling to X', where the value of 'X' is determined by the conversational context. 'Said that' diagnostics, disagreement diagnostics and exocentric uses of taste vocabulary (Lasersohn 2009) all fail to show that relativism proper can accommodate data which flexible contextualism cannot accommodate. For example, if Big Guy kindly reminds Small Guy 'remember, a medium-sized pie at this restaurant will be too filling', and Small Guy kindly reminds Big Guy 'remember, a medium-sized pie at this restaurant will not be filling enough', there is no sense in which there is disagreement, and the exocentric uses of the taste vocabulary illustrated by this example are adequately accommodated by flexible contextualism.

Of course, Big Guy and Small guy could get into an argument over whether a certain pie is too filling or not, but if they did, then it would tempting to judge that they were simply speaking past each other. It is certainly true that we do not have strong intuitions in such cases concerning whether or not there is a proposition whose relative truth-value the disputants disagree about.

I think C & H are essentially right that a flexible contextualism can accommodate the data from predicates of personal taste as well as relativistic semantics can.   However, to show that Simplicity is true it does not suffice to show that predicates of personal taste are context-sensitive. There are other data that are not as easily accommodated by Simplicity, namely data from perception. I now turn to my main argument against Simplicity (and hence against the monadic truth package).

2. The Argument from Perception

My main argument against the monadic truth package offered by C & H runs as follows:

(1) Perceptual experience is a propositional attitude
(2) The objects of perceptual experience do not instantiate the fundamental monadic properties of truth simpliciter and falsity simpliciter.

(3) By T3, the objects of perceptual experience are propositions

(4) Hence, propositions do not instantiate the fundamental monadic properties of truth simpliciter and falsity simpliciter.

The premises in need of justification in the present context are premises 1 and 2. It may seem that the most obvious way to preserve Simplicity is to reject premise 1. C & H might say that perceptual experience is an attitude to something other than a proposition, perhaps a kind of semantic value that does not have a full propositional form. But, given Simplicity, this move is not very plausible. Some hold that perceptual experience is belief (e.g. Byrne 2009 and Glüer 2009). But even if one denies that perceptual experience is belief, one ought to grant that in favorable circumstances perceptual experience can give rise to a belief with the same content. In other words, if I have a conscious perceptual experience with content P, then that ought to give rise to a belief with content P in favorable circumstances. It follows that if the content of perception is not propositional, neither is the content of beliefs that are formed directly on the basis of perceptual experience. Hence, C & H must hold, not only that perceptual experience is not a propositional attitude, but also that belief in general is not. But this contradicts T3, as formulated. So, it would be unwise for C & H to reject premise 1.

C & H must then reject premise 2. I will offer two arguments in favor of premise 2. The first argument rests on the empirical assumption that there is variability in color perception and the theoretical assumption that weak representationalism is true. This argument also can be seen as an argument against color relationalism, as defended by Cohen (2004, 2009a, 2009b). According to color relationalism, the colors are relational properties that have viewing systems and viewing conditions as their relata. For example, this tomato is not simply red, but red-relative-to-me-and-my-current-viewing-conditions, red-relative-to-viewing-system-T-and-viewing-condition-C, etc. The second argument in favor of premise 2 rests only on the theoretical assumption that weak representionalism is true.

Variability: It is empirically verified that color perception varies greatly across perceivers. Your best sample of red may be my best sample of orange (for discussion see e.g. Cohen 2004 and Brogaard 2009b). This sort of variability in color perception has been taken by some to suggest that color properties in the content of perception are relational properties to viewing systems and viewing conditions (see Cohen 2004, 2009a, 2009b) and by others to suggest that they are non-relational color constituents that have extensions only relative to viewing systems and viewing conditions (see Brogaard 2009a, 2009c). There are two alternative ways of accommodating variability: one can hold that the color properties in the content of perception

do not have extensions (Pautz 2006) or have only imperfect extensions (Chalmers 2006a) or that whenever there is disagreement about an object's color, at least one of the disputants is wrong (Tye 2000, Byrne and Hilbert 2003). The former view entails that color experience is never veridical. The latter view entails a version of epistemicism about what the colors of objects are: There is, in many cases of disagreement about the colors of objects, no way of coming to know who (if any) is right.

Representationalism: Representationalism, in its weakest formulation, is the view the phenomenology of perceptual experience determines the content of perceptual experience. On this view, a phenomenally red experience has a content that contains a red color constituent. Given its weakest formulation, representationalism is exceedingly plausible (Tye 2000, Chalmers 2004, Siegel forthcoming). Qualia theorists and those who deny that perception has content will deny it. But it is fair to say that these latter views are minority views (see the recent PhilPapers Survey, http://philpapers.org/surveys/).

First Argument for Premise2: My first argument for premise 2 runs as follows. It is plausible that you and I, in spite of having radically different perceptual systems and in spite of being in radically different viewing conditions, can have the same phenomenally red experience (veridical or non-veridical). By weak representationalism, our experiences have the same content. If color constituents in the content of perception are relational properties that have viewing systems and viewing conditions as relata, then our phenomenally red experiences have different contents. One has the content *That is red relative to V1*, and the other has the content *that is red relative to V2*.[3] Hence, pace Cohen (2004, 2009a, 2009b) it is not the case that color properties in the content of perception are relations to viewer systems and viewing

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[3] One move suggested to me by Jonathan Cohen in conversation is to claim that the parameters can take pretty coarse-grained values, such that perceivers V1 and V2 both count as instances of the same type. The perceiver parameter doesn't need to be as fine-grained as an individual visual system or a time slice thereof. He takes it to be an open question how coarse or fine grained the visual system and for that matter belief represents in these contents. In fact, a natural move here, he says, is to say that the visual system represents *both* the fine grained content and the coarse grained content. So there's a level of perceptual content had by the experiences on which they agree as well as a separate level of perceptual content had by the experiences on which they differ. This move, he says, would solve my worry about shared content. Effectively, this is just the thought that flexible contextualism about perceptual contents allows for a different, flexibly assigned value for the relatum in relational perceptual contents such that different perceivers can share one and the same perceptual content. My main problem with this move is that while it is clear that the implicit values of hidden variables in sentences can be assigned values other than the speaker, it is not clear to me how this would work in the case of perception. In the case of perception there are no sentences to carry the hidden variables. It seems to me that Cohen's move just amounts to denying that two different perceivers could have radically different viewing systems and yet have experiences with the same phenomenal character.

conditions. Rather: color constituents in the content of perception are non-relational entities that have extensions relative to viewer systems and viewing conditions, or irrealism or epistemicism is true. It follows that the content of perception are not true or false simpliciter, or irrealism or epistemicism is true.

Second Argument for Premise 2: When I look at two trees at different distances from me, I can see that one tree is further away from me than the other. Moreover, it is plausible that you and I can have perceptual experiences with the same phenomenology of the two trees (perhaps at different times). By weak representationalism, our experiences have the same content. So, our perceptual experiences cannot contain you or me in the content of perception. Rather, they must contain semantic values that have extensions only relative to perceivers. Hence, the contents of our experiences do not instantiate the fundamental monadic properties of truth simpliciter and falsity simpliciter.

How might C & H respond to these arguments? In regard to the first argument for premise 2 the options are: (i) reject weak representationalism, (ii) adopt irrealism, or (iii) adopt epistemicism. I shall not offer any speculations as to what they would opt to do. The second argument for premise 2 is harder to get around. In order to get around it C & H must reject weak representationalism.   As weak representationalism is far more plausible than Simplicity, Simplicity is likely false.   Hence, it is not very likely that all propositions instantiate the fundamental monadic properties of truth simpliciter and falsity simpliciter.

3. Non-Indexical Contextualism

I will now offer an argument against C & H's claim that non-indexical contextualism is not an 'interesting position in logical space'. Their main argument against non-indexical contextualism was that it has unintuitive consequences. It entails that the following exchange should be acceptable:

> John: Sample A is the best case of red

> Mary: No, sample A is not the best case of red. Non-indexical contextualism is true. Hence, while your utterance is true, the proposition you are expressing by your utterance is not true.

John MacFarlane (2009) has replied that the notion of utterance truth is a technical term. Hence, our intuitions about these cases are notoriously unreliable. C & H reply to this that 'if utterance truth is an uninteresting, utterly technical notion, then it is hard to see how it can matter to the debate' (p. 23). According to C & H, unless a different argument can be given in favor of non-indexical contextualism and against relativism, then what matters to the debate is only what non-indexical contextualism and relativism proper have in common. I agree with C & H about this: A different argument is needed in order to settle the debate between non-indexical contextualism and relativism proper. However, all I need to do here in order to show that non-indexical contextualism occupies an interesting position in logical space is show that it does better than relativism proper with respect to a specific class of expressions. I shall focus on color terms.

Setting aside epistemicism and irrealism, and assuming weak representationalism, my argument for premise 2 in the previous section establishes that the color properties in the content of color perception have extensions only relative to perceivers and viewing conditions. Since our job now is to determine whether non-indexical contextualism has anything to offer which relativism cannot offer, we are justified in disregarding epistemicism and irrealism. The task before us then is to determine the nature of the individuals in the extension of color contents of color experience. If the individuals in the extension of the color content of color experience are the perceivers who actually undergo the color experience, then non-indexical contextualism will be true for some types of color discourse. If the individuals are the perceivers who assess the content of color experience for truth, then relativism proper will be true for some types of color discourse.   But it is easy to see that the color contents of color experiences have extensions relative to the perceivers who have the color experiences rather than relative to the perceivers who assess the content for truth. Consider the following example:

John and Mary are asked to view a dozen color samples and determine which sample is the best case of red.   John perceives sample A as the best case of red and forms a belief to the effect that sample A is the best case of red directly on the basis of his perceptual experience. Mary perceives sample B as the best case of red and forms a belief to the effect that sample B is the best case of red directly on the basis of her perceptual experience.

If colors have extensions relative to perceivers, then John's perceptual experience is veridical just in case sample A is the best case of red relative to him, and Mary's perceptual experience is veridical just in case sample B is the best case of red relative to her. So, when John sincerely utters 'Sample A is the best case of red', then Mary ought to assess the content of John's utterance as true just in case sample A is the best case of red relative to John. Likewise, if Mary sincerely utters 'Sample B is the best case of red', then John ought to assess

the content of Mary's utterance as true just in case sample B is the best case of red relative to Mary. But this suffices to show that non-indexical contextualism, but not standard non-flexible relativism, is true for first-person uses of color terms. For, if relativism had been true, then the content of John's utterance would be false relative to Mary as the assessor, and the content of Mary's utterance would be false relative to John as the assessor.

Of course, John and Mary may well get into a dispute about whether sample A is the best case of red. However, as C & H point out repeatedly throughout their book, we cannot take conversational disagreement data at face value (see e.g. p. 101). Mary and John's disagreement is a kind of verbal dispute. At best it shows that John and Mary disagree about the relative truth-value of a certain proposition. It does not show that the content of John's utterance is true relative to Mary, or that the content of Mary's utterance is true relative to John. When John sincerely says that sample A is the best case of red, his utterance is grounded in his belief that sample A is the best case of red. This belief, in turn, is grounded in his perceptual experience of A being the best sample of red. But the content of his experience is true relative to him, not relative to Mary. Hence, the content of his utterance is true relative to him, not relative to Mary. So, relativism offers the wrong account of first-person uses of color terms. With respect to first-person uses of color-terms non-indexical contextualism thus occupies a more interesting position in logical space than does relativism proper.

4. Temporalism Defended

C & H's main argument against the operator-view of the tenses, and hence implicitly against temporalism, was that there is no good reason to treat sentences of the form 'Paul danced' as being of the form 'It was the case that (Paul dances)'. It is less obvious that the same point can be made with respect to natural-language sentences such as 'it will be the case that Paul is dancing'. This latter sentence seems to be composed of a future-tense operator 'it will be the case that' and the sentence 'Paul is dancing'. I would be curious to hear how C & H propose to handle those kinds of cases. However, I shall not focus on those kinds of cases here. Instead I shall offer a simple argument in favor of temporalism and hence implicitly in favor of the operator-view of tense.

Like my arguments against Simplicity the argument for temporalism rests on weak representationalism. Consider the following example. John is witness to a murder. He sees the murderer escape in a red Ford and forms a belief to the effect that the car is red directly on the basis of his perceptual experience. Now John could have had an experience with the very same phenomenology if the murder had taken place two hours later than it did. But weak representationalism entails that phenomenology determines content. So, if the

phenomenology is the same on those two occasions (the real one and the counterfactual one), then the content of the experiences on the two occasions must also be the same. If the contents of the experiences had contained the time of experience, the contents of the experiences would be different. So, the contents of the experiences do not contain a time among their constituents.

Since John's belief is formed directly on the basis of his perception, John's belief has the same content as his perceptual experience. So, his belief that the car is red does not contain a time constituent either. Hence, the content of his belief is temporally neutral. Since the objects of beliefs are propositions according to C & H, the content of John's belief is a proposition. So, there are temporally neutral propositions. As there are temporally neutral propositions, either weak representationalism is false or Simplicity is. But weak representationalism is far more plausible than Simplicity; hence, Simplicity is likely false.

5. Conclusion

Two of the central theses of the monadic truth package (Simplicity) are (i) there are propositions and they instantiate the fundamental monadic properties of truth simpliciter and falsity simpliciter, and (ii) propositions are the objects of propositional attitudes, such as belief, hope, wish, doubt, etc. I have argued that Simplicity is in conflict with a central and plausible thesis about content, known as 'weak representationalism'. If weak representationalism is true, then phenomenology determines perceptual content. Suppose I have an experience as of one tree being further away from me than another. You could have an experience with the same phenomenology. Hence, the content of our experiences cannot contain you or me as constituents of the contents of our experiences. My experience is nonetheless veridical only if the one tree is further away from me than the other, and your experience is veridical only if the one tree is further away from you than the other. Hence, we have experiences with contents that are neutral with respect to perceivers but which have extensions only relative to perceivers. But if weak representationalism is true, then perceptual experience has content. Moreover, because beliefs have propositions as objects, according to Simplicity, and a belief can have the same content as the perceptual experience on which is based, Simplity and representationalism entail that perceptual experience is a propositional attitude. So, there are propositions which have extensions only relative to perceivers. So, if weak representationalism is true, Simplicity is false.

I have furthermore offered an argument against C & H's claim that non-indexical contextualism does not occupy an interesting position in logical space with respect to any English expressions. They think non-indexical contextualism is uninteresting, because whatever

it has to offer can be equally well accommodated by relativism. However, I have showed, using the same argument strategy as before, that if relativism and non-indexical contextualism are the only options on the table, then first-person uses of color terms are best accounted for within a non-indexical contextualist semantics.   In the final section of the paper I provided a simple argument for temporalism resting on weak representationalism using once again the same argument strategy.   Based on these considerations, I conclude that Simplicity is not a very viable position.

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